

Post-quantum zero-knowledge proofs with constant-depth quantum simulators

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Research work under the supervision of Alex B. Grilo & Damien Vergnaud



Introduction

Zero-knowledge proof: interactive protocol between a prover $\mathcal{P}$ and verifier $\mathcal{V}$. [GMR85]

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Definition

A **simulator** S for a protocol Π is a polytime probabilistic algorithm with black-box access to $\mathcal{V}$, and which output is indistinguishable from the transcript of a real execution of Π .

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Classical adversary (=verifier)

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Conjecture

Let $\mathbb{L}$ be a language that admits a ZK protocol with a constant-depth simulator; then, $\mathbb{L} \in \mathbf{BQP}^a$.

^aBQP = Bounded-error Quantum Polynomial time

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- Exact definition of black-box zero-knowledge:

→ A ZK black-box protocol $\implies$ there exists a simulator Sim such that **for all verifiers**, $\text{Output}(Sim(\mathcal{V})) \approx \text{Transcript}(\mathcal{P} \leftrightarrow \mathcal{V})$

Contributions: Lemma 1

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$$U'_i = |S_{i+1}\rangle \langle S_i| \otimes U_i + |S_i\rangle \langle S_{i+1}| \otimes U_i^\dagger + \sum_x \begin{matrix} |x\rangle \perp |S_i\rangle \\ |x\rangle \perp |S_{i+1}\rangle \end{matrix} |x\rangle \langle x| \otimes \mathbb{1}$$

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
$\text{Transcript}(\mathcal{P} \leftrightarrow \mathcal{V}') \approx \text{Transcript}(\mathcal{P} \leftrightarrow \mathcal{V})$ **and** $\text{Output}(Sim(\mathcal{V}')) \approx \text{Output}(Sim(\mathcal{V}))$

Contributions: a second simulator

Let us now build a second simulator Sim_2 for $\mathcal{V}$, where Sim_2 takes care of doing the additional actions $\mathcal{V}'$.


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
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
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
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Consequence


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
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


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


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
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→ **Every $|S_i\rangle$ or $|S_{i+1}\rangle$ given to the adversary at instant t must be given back at instant $t + 1$.**

Contributions: proof of indistinguishability

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For both case, we can build $\mathcal{A}$, which takes a quantum coin $|\$ \rangle$ as input, and returns $|\$ \rangle \otimes |\$ \rangle$ with nonnegligible probability.

Contributions: intuition of proof

Example, case 2: $\pi \in \mathcal{L}(FSM)$, one projection associated to a $U_i^{\leftrightarrow}$ failed.

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In both subcases, $\mathcal{A}$ can clone any arbitrary quantum coin:

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
Contributions: intuition of the proof (cont'd)

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
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
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
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
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
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


We replace $|S_3\rangle$ with the quantum coin $|\$ \rangle$.

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


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


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→ What $\mathcal{A}$ returns is $|\$ \rangle \otimes |\$ \rangle$ with probability $1/\text{poly}$.

Contributions: properties of Sim_3

Consequence

If $\text{Sim}_3(\mathcal{V})$ is distinguishable from $\text{Sim}_2(\mathcal{V})$, we can easily clone a quantum coin. **Absurd by [AC12], therefore Lemma 2 is true.**

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Proposition

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- All sequential simulators respect the constraints imposed by FSM + Sim_3 .
- What about parallel ones?

Contributions: parallel simulator




Figure: Parallel simulator

Contributions: Lemma 3

Considering that:

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
→ Effective query to $\mathcal{V}$ = request that actually happened **at runtime**.

Discussion, next steps

$$W = |1\rangle \langle 1| \otimes U_i + |0\rangle \langle 0| \otimes \mathbb{1}$$

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
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
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
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
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
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
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Figure: Some variations of the control qubit in W


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
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
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
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
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
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- 1 Prove that Lemma 3 implies the existence of Sim_4 , which makes a constant number of queries to $\mathcal{V}$ (without 'effective').
- 2 Prove that Sim_4 implies $\mathbb{L} \in \mathbf{BQP}$ (see [Chi+21])

Thank you for your attention



- [AC12] Scott Aaronson and Paul Christiano. “Quantum money from hidden subspaces”. In: *Proceedings of the Forty-Fourth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing*. STOC '12. New York, New York, USA: Association for Computing Machinery, 2012, pp. 41–60. ISBN: 9781450312455. DOI: 10.1145/2213977.2213983. URL: <https://doi.org/10.1145/2213977.2213983>.
- [Chi+21] Nai-Hui Chia et al. *On the Impossibility of Post-Quantum Black-Box Zero-Knowledge in Constant Rounds*. 2021. arXiv: 2103.11244 [cs.CR]. URL: <https://arxiv.org/abs/2103.11244>.
- [GMR85] Shafi Goldwasser, Silvio Micali, and Charles Rackoff. “The knowledge complexity of interactive proof-systems”. In: *Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing*. STOC '85. New York, NY, USA: Association for Computing Machinery, Dec. 1985, pp. 291–304. ISBN: 978-0-89791-151-1. DOI: 10.1145/22145.22178. URL: <https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/22145.22178>.

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
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
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
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
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
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


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